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École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne
thomas.weber@epfl.ch

Abstract
In the face of demand uncertainty, a monopolist can observe sales as a controlled reaction to its price and advertising so as to improve the choice of this marketing
mix in the future. Furthermore, to upgrade its knowledge about demand the firm has the option to invest in
external market intelligence and thus to directly acquire
relevant information. Using a two-period model we determine the firm’s profit-maximizing learning strategy
using all three of these levers: price, advertising, and information acquisition. This illustrates the firm’s tradeoff
of actively managing its consumer base through costly
marketing, exploiting expected demand through pricing,
and increasing the efficiency of its actions by means of
costly outside information. An extension of the model
to the case with internal budget constraints on information acquisition is provided, and a numerical example is
discussed.

1

Introduction

In a dynamic market fraught with uncertainty a firm
can acquire information to improve its operational decisions. It can also spend money on advertising, increasing the demand for its products. Here we examine the
joint problem of advertising, pricing, and information
acquisition. This extends the consideration set of the
pricing and advertising decisions in the seminal contribution by Dorfman and Steiner [9] to include information acquisition in a simple and analytically tractable
setting. The problem is solved using dynamic programming; informational and operational actions persistently interact, and information can come from an outside source (such as a market-research firm) and from
an internal source (through observation of unit sales).
∗ The

1.1

Literature

In their well-known article, Dorfman and Steiner [9]
examine the static problem of jointly optimizing price
and advertising expenditures, deriving a system of equations which involve elasticities of demand with respect
to price and with respect to advertising. Nerlove and
Arrow [18] consider a dynamic version of the joint optimization problem, using simple dynamics with respect
to the diminishing effect of past advertising and a functional form that allows for an effective separation of the
pricing problem from the system dynamics. Holthausen
and Assmus [12] present a model for the allocation of an
advertising budget to geographic market segments when
the sales response to advertising in each segment is characterized by a probability distribution. It is shown that
allocation decisions that are based on the expected sales
response may be associated with a relatively large degree of risk and, therefore, non-optimal to a risk-averse
manager. Their model produces an “efficient frontier”
in terms of the expected profit and its variance resulting
from alternative budget allocations. The manager then
chooses the optimal allocation based on his/her preference function.
In single-person decision problems, information has
a positive benefit at the margin, and more informative
information sources are of (weakly) greater value than
less informative ones [4].1 “Garbling” an information
source, which amounts to adding noise, decreases its
value at least weakly [8]. Naturally, this result persists
in a Bayesian setting [13]: for example, the value of a
Gaussian information source is increasing in its precision (or “confidence”), defined as the inverse of its variance. Here we use the Gaussian setting because normally distributed prior beliefs update to normally distributed posterior beliefs, by means of observing normally distributed informative signals [19]. Wald [22] introduces the dynamic information-acquisition problem

author wishes to thank Ksenia Gattiker for valuable research assistance at the outset of this project.
multiple decision-makers interact strategically, the marginal value of information may well be negative [10, 11, 23].
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in a very general framework. Based on elements of that
framework, Moscarini and Smith [17] consider information acquisition in continuous time so as to inform
a binary decision. A specific binary decision, namely
technology adoption, is considered by McCardle [14]
in discrete time, with information acquisition. This implies an optimal stopping problem and an optimal policy
that depends on belief thresholds. Moore and Whinston [15, 16] also analyze sequential information acquisition, followed by a final action.2 By contrast, we
are concerned here with problems where (nonbinary)
control interventions and information acquisition coexist from period to period, in spirit similar to Weber and
Nguyen [25] who examine a linear-quadratic Gaussian
optimal control problem over an infinite horizon. In our
setting, information acquisition is both internal and external, in the sense that at the beginning of each period
there is an external source of information that can decrease the noisiness of the underlying system. Yet, at
the end of each period (only relevant for the first period),
there is an internal information acquisition by observing
a relevant system statistic (in our case, the demand realization) that allows a separate, cost-free Bayesian belief
update.
The main contribution of this paper is to examine
the joint use of advertising and information acquisition
as profitability-enhancing measures the firm can take
and to disentangle their effects, in a simple analytically
tractable setting.

1.2

Outline

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Sec. 2 introduces our model of the firm’s dynamic
price-advertising and information-acquisition decisions.
Sec. 3 provides the quasi-static solution to the firm’s
problem where the firm acquires outside information
and chooses its price and advertising optimally. This
serves as the terminal period for the company’s dynamic
decision problem, which is solved in Sec. 4. Finally,
Sec. 5 concludes the paper. The paper is new in that
it combines the two types of decisions, operational and
informational. In addition, informational actions can be
external as well as internal. Indeed, observing the market’s reaction in terms of unit sales (demand) is quasifree, as it is directly related to the company’s sales figures which are readily available in a company’s accounting department.

2

Model

Consider a situation where at each time t ∈ {0, 1} the
firm faces a random demand of the form
D̃t (at , pt ) = θ̃ + at − pt + ν̃t ,
where at is the amount of advertising, pt the firm’s
price, and θ̃ the uncertain market potential whose true
value is persistent between periods, and ν̃t a zero-mean
unsystematic noise term which is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) between periods. For concreteness, we assume that both random variables are normally distributed, so that
θ̃ ∼ N (µ, σ 2 ) and ν̃t ∼ N (0, σν2 ),
where µ is the positive expected demand, σ is the positive standard deviation of the market potential, and σν
is the nonnegative standard deviation of the unsystematic noise. At the beginning of each period, the firm
has the option to acquire an informative signal which—
conditional on the realized market potential θ—is of the
form:
s̃t |θ = θ + ε̃t ,
where ε̃t ∼ N (0, 1/κt ) is a zero-mean normally distributed observational noise, with precision κt ≥ 0. If
the signal’s precision vanishes (κt = 0), then the firm
acquires no information at all. The company’s cost realization at time t depends on the demand realization Dt ,
its advertising activity at , and the chosen precision κt
of the acquired information:
Ct (at , pt , κt ) = cDt + (α/2) a2t + βκ2t .
The nonnegative marginal production cost c ≥ 0 is constant, the cost of advertising is quadratic (scaled by the
positive constant α), and the cost of information acquisition is quadratic in the precision (scaled by the nonnegative constant β). To avoid the degenerate outcome that
the firm can increase its demand through advertising at
a marginal cost that is below its marginal benefit, one
needs to assume that marketing expenditures are “significant” in the sense that
α > 1/2;
as shown in the next section, this restriction guarantees
that the firm’s absolute spending on advertising stays finite.

2 Some applications in healthcare are of this form; see, e.g., Cipriano and Weber [6] who determine the amount of information to collect
(using public health screening) to inform a planner’s decision to discontinue a public health screening program for hepatitis C.
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Figure 1: Timeline.
and where δ = 1/(1 + r) ∈ (0, 1] is the firm’s perperiod discount rate based on the per-period interest
rate r ≥ 0.4
The timing and mechanism of the firm’s actions and
Bayesian belief updates are as follows. At the beginning of period t = 0, the firm starts out with a prior
belief about θ̃ which is reflected in the vector of first
and second moments (µ, σ 2 ), which provide a complete description of the underlying normal distribution
N (µ, σ 2 ). Then the firm chooses κ0 , effectively deciding about how much external market intelligence to
acquire, which will allow it to observe the signal realization s0 , based on which its belief is updated to
(µ0 , σ02 ). The firm then selects its time-0 operational
variables, advertising (a0 ) and price (p0 ), and observes
the demand realization d = D0 (a0 , p0 ) which allows
for a further Bayesian update of its belief about θ̃, to
(µd , σd2 ). At the beginning of period t = 1, the firm decides about how much information to acquire in terms
of the signal precision κ1 , and then updates its belief
accordingly. Finally, the firm chooses its time-1 operaLet It denote the information available to the firm tional variables a1 and p1 so as to maximize this period’s
at time t. Then the firm’s decision problem consists in profits. Fig. 1 summarizes the timing of the information
finding a policy πt = πt (It ), with πt = (at , pt , κt ), updates and the firm’s operational decisions.
which maximizes its expected discounted profits,
The dynamic programming principle [2, 3] implies
that
a solution to this finite-horizon discrete-time dy1
h
i
X
t
namic
optimization problem can be obtained via backmax
E δ Π̃t (at , pt , κt ) It ,
(π0 ,π1 )
ward
induction,
starting with the second period. Act=0
cordingly we obtain the quasi-static policy as the termiwhere the firm’s uncertain time-t profit Π̃t (at , pt , κt )
nal policy of the two-period problem, which is discussed
has the realization
next in Sec. 3. The first-period problem is then solved
Πt (at , pt , κt ) = pt Dt (at , pt ) − Ct (at , pt , κt ),
in Sec. 4.

Remark 1 (Special Cases). When marginal cost is zero
(c = 0), the firm effectively focuses on revenue maximization. In practice, this situation may occur for information products, such as computer software and digital content (e.g., music or ebooks)—at least approximately.3 The case where advertising becomes prohibitively expensive (α → ∞) reduces the firm’s operational decision variables to price only, which may serve
as an interesting base case. Finally, if the cost of information acquisition vanishes (β → 0+ ), then the firm
will simply maximize expected profit (subject to the remaining unsystematic risk) and if outside information
becomes prohibitively expensive (β → ∞), then the
firm refrains from acquiring outside market intelligence
and its learning is restricted to what it can gather by observing demand realizations as a reaction to its operational price-advertising decisions. As shown in the next
two sections, there exists a positive but finite threshold
for the marginal information-acquisition cost β, above
which the firm will not actively acquire information and
thus is indifferent to any further increase of β.

3 Upon

closer examination, the provision of most information products does in fact have a positive marginal cost, albeit possibly very small.
interest r can be viewed as the firm’s opportunity cost of capital, corresponding to the investors’ next-best investment return at the
same risk. Interestingly, the firm’s risk in this model is endogenously determined by its actions, and consequently the company’s internal
risk-return tradeoff may not be the same as the risk-return tradeoff in the market (as exemplified by the local slope of the efficient frontier in
a CAPM-setting). The latter means that in fact the applicable discount rate may vary (at least in the medium-run) as a function of the firm’s
actions, an interesting second-order effect we are neglecting here.
4 The
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3

Quasi-Static Policy

At the end of the last period (t = 1), the firm’s belief
about the market potential θ̃ is given by (µ1 , σ12 ). The
firm now solves a profit-maximization problem with respect to its operational variables,

max (p1 − c)(µ1 + a1 − p1 ) − (α/2) a21 ,
a1 ,p1

which yields the unique solution
a∗1

=

p∗1

=

α̂ (µ1 − c),
µ1 + c
(1 + α̂)
,
2

yields the firm’s optimal terminal information acquisition,6
#
"


1/3
1
1
1
1
+
α̂
∗
=
,
− 2
− 2
κ1 =
4β
σd
σ 2d
σd +
+
¯
1/3

where σ 2d , (4β/(1 + α̂))
denotes the variance
¯ For belief variances σ 2 below the threshold
threshold.
d
σ 2d at the beginning of the second period it is in the firm’s
¯ interest not to acquire any information prior to takbest
ing its terminal operational decisions; see Fig. 2.

where we denote by
α̂ ,

1
∈ [0, ∞)
2α − 1

the advertising effectiveness which is decreasing in α >
1/2 and tends to zero as α goes to infinity (i.e., when advertising becomes prohibitively expensive). The firm’s
maximized terminal expected profit is obtained by substituting (a∗1 , p∗1 ) into the preceding objective function:
Π∗1 = (1 + α̂)

(µ1 − c)2
.
4

Given the firm’s belief (µd , σd2 ), information acquisition
(via κ1 ) therefore results in expected profits of

 h
i
1 + α̂
2
Π̂1 (κ1 ) ,
E (µ1 (s̃1 ) − c) − βκ21 .
4
The value for the firm derives from the fact that its terminal operational decisions can be adjusted. Indeed, after having observed the informative signal realization s1
the firm can update its market-potential estimator from
µd to the weighted average
µ1 (s1 ) = λ1 s1 + (1 − λ1 )µd ,
where λ1 , κ1 σd2 /(1 + κ1 σd2 ) ∈ [0, 1] is increasing in
κ1 .5 As a result, the terminal profit (prior to information
acquisition) becomes
Π̂1 (κ1 )

=
=

1 + α̂
4
1 + α̂
4


(µd − c)2 + λ21 σd2 − βκ21


κ21 σd6
(µd − c)2 +
− βκ21 .
(1 + κ1 σd2 )2


The first term of the firm’s payoff is independent of the
informational precision and corresponds to the firm’s
profit without information acquisition. The sum of the
following two terms is concave in κ1 and maximization
5 The

Figure 2: Optimal information acquisition at time t = 1.
Remark 2 (Information-Cost Threshold). The expression for κ∗1 implies the cost threshold β̄d , (1 +
α̂)σd6 /4, so that nontrivial market intelligence is economical if and only if the firm’s information-acquisition
cost is such that β ∈ (0, β̄d ).
Substituting the firm’s terminal informationacquisition policy into its expected payoffs yields

 !
2
2 3
2
σ
σ
(µ
−
c)
d
Π̂1 (κ∗1 ) = (1 + α̂)
+ d 1 − ¯ d2
.
4
4
σd +
The last expression neatly illustrates the separate effects
of information acquisition and of advertising in the company’s quasi-static decision problem that it faces in the
last period. Information acquisition improves the effectiveness of both pricing and advertising, resulting in an
additive improvement ∆1 ≥ 0 of the no-advertising-noinformation profit (µd − c)2 /4. This augmented profit
is scaled by the factor (1 + α̂) which contains the advertising effectiveness α̂ ≥ 0. In other words,
Π̂∗1 , Π̂1 (κ∗1 ) = (1 + α̂) (Π1 (0, pm
1 , 0) + ∆1 ) ,

firm also updates the variance of its belief, from σd2 to σd2 /(1 + κ1 σd2 ), independent of s1 .
and in what follows we use the abbreviation [x]+ , max{0, x} for all x ∈ R.

6 Here
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where pm
1 , (µd + c)/2 is the standard solution of
the monopoly pricing problem [21] with linear demand
curve without advertising and without information acquisition, while
∆1 ,


3
σd2
σ2
1 − ¯ d2
4
σd +

is the information-related (pre-advertising) profit increment. The firm’s expected monopoly profit without advertising and information acquisition is
Π1 (0, pm
1 , 0) =

(µd − c)2
.
4

The expected value of sample information (EVSI) about
the demand at time t = 1 is the difference between the
firm’s optimal time-1 profit and its profit without information acquisition:
EVSI1 = Π̂∗1 − Π̂1 (0) = (1 + α̂)∆1 .
This expression implies a complementarity between advertising and information acquisition, in the sense that a
better advertising effectiveness also increases the value
of information, as noted in the following remark.
Remark 3 (Parameter Sensitivity). The firm’s optimal time-1 profit Π̂∗1 is increasing in the advertising effectiveness α̂ and (weakly) decreasing in the marginal
information-acquisition cost β, with corresponding sensitivities

2
σd2
∂ Π̂∗1
σ 2d
m
= Π1 (0, p1 , 0) +
> 0,
1 − ¯2
∂ α̂
4
σd +

4

Dynamic Policy

We are now ready to consider the firm’s dynamic twoperiod decision problem, as formulated in Sec. 2. The
firm’s second-period problem amounts to the quasistatic profit-maximization problem discussed in the last
section. Pursuing the dynamic-programming strategy of
backward induction, in what follows we first look at the
firm’s belief update from the observed demand realization. The latter allows learning even if no information
is acquired from the outside. We then turn our attention
to the operational decisions, before we solve the initial
information-acquisition problem.

4.1

Learning from Demand Observation

In addition to externally furnished costly market intelligence, the firm usually has access to the information revealed by the market’s response to its product offering,
which in our case is modulated by the product price p0
and the company’s advertising activity a0 . Indeed, the
firm’s realized demand at the end of the first period is
D0 = θ + a0 − p0 + ν0 ,
where θ and ν0 are the realizations of the unknown (and
therefore random) market potential θ̃ and the unsystematic noise ν̃0 , respectively. Similar to the belief update
in the terminal period, the belief update about θ̃ is informed by the realization
sd = D0 − (a0 − p0 )
of an informative signal, with conditional distribution

and

s̃d |θ ∼ N (θ, σν2 ).
∂(EVSI1 )
1
1
∂ Π̂∗1
=
=− 2 − 2
∂β
∂β
σd
σd
¯


2
≤ 0,
+

That is, the confidence related to the firm’s demand observation is given by

respectively.7

κν , 1/σν2 .

Remark 4 (Perfect Information). In the fortunate case
where β → 0+ , information-acquisition costs vanish As before, we obtain the firm’s updated estimate for the
and the firm can obtain perfect demand information at market potential as weighted average,
no cost. This implies an expected value of perfect inforµd (sd ) = λd sd + (1 − λd )µ0 ,
mation (EVPI),
EVPI1 =

(1 + α̂) σd2
.
4

The latter is an upper bound for the expected value of
sample information, EVSI1 , determined earlier.

where λd , κν σ02 /(1 + κν σ02 ). Meanwhile, the updated
variance is given by (see footnote 5)
σd2 =

σ2 σ2
σ02
= 20 ν 2.
2
1 + κν σ0
σ0 + σν

7 Moreover, the firm’s optimal time-1 profit is (weakly) convex in α̂ and β, respectively. However, the cross-effect of the two parameters is
(weakly) negative, ∂ 2 Π̂∗1 /(∂ α̂∂β) ≤ 0, so an increase in the advertising effectiveness increases the firm’s sensitivity with respect to decreases
in the marginal information-acquisition cost.
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The expressions for the demand-induced updated belief (µd , σd2 ) can now be substituted into the terminal
profit Π̂∗1 obtained in the preceding section:
Π̄∗1 = (1 + α̂)




(µ0 − c)2
+ ∆0 ,
4

where

3
σ 2 σ 2 /4
σ2 + σ2 σ2
σ 6 /4
.
∆0 , 2 0 2 2 + 20 ν 2 1 − 0 2 ν ¯ d2
(σ0 + σν )
σ0 + σν
σ0 σν +
The first term on the right-hand side represents the firm’s
EVSI for the demand observation, which is increasing
in its belief uncertainty σ02 . Viewed from the end of the
first period, the second term on the right-hand side captures the fact that information is anticipated to be acquired in the following terminal period if and only if
1
1
1
+ 2 < 2.
σ02
σν
σd
¯

4.2

Operational Decisions

Based on the firm’s “free” belief update, by actively
using its own internal market intelligence 8 the firm’s
profit-maximization problem, after initial information
acquisition (κ0 ), is similar to the problem in the terminal
period (our “quasi-static setting” in Sec. 3):

max (p0 − c)(µ0 + a0 − p0 ) − (α/2) a20 ,
a0 ,p0

with the unique solution
a∗0
p∗0

= α̂ (µ0 − c),
µ0 + c
,
= (1 + α̂)
2

as before. As a result, the optimal expected discounted
profit (after initial information acquisition) becomes


(1 + α̂)(µ0 − c)2
∗
Π̂0 (κ0 ) = Eµ0
+ δ Π̄1 − βκ20 ,
4
given the firm’s initial belief (µ, σ 2 ).

In particular, the “target variance” σ 2d needs to be strictly
smaller than min{σ02 , σν2 }, that is, ¯smaller than the vari- 4.3 Information-Acquisition Decisions
ance of the unsystematic noise and smaller than the Consider now the problem of external information acresidual variance after external information acquisition quisition at the outset. As before, Bayesian updating
at the beginning of the first period.
of the firm’s initial belief (µ, σ 2 ) using the informative
external signal realization s0 at the chosen confidence
Remark 5 (Information-Value Consistency). To ex- level κ yields
0
amine the consistency of the expected information values ∆0 and ∆1 before and immediately after the firm’s
µ0 (s0 ) = λ0 s0 + (1 − λ0 )µ,
observing demand, consider the extreme cases of perfect
2
2
inference (where σν → 0+ ) and uninformative infer- where λ0 = κ0 σ /(1 + κ0 σ ), and
ence (where σν → ∞), respectively. (i) With noiseless
σ2
σ02 =
.
demand information one obtains limσν →0+ ∆0 = σ02 /4
1 + κ0 σ 2
and ∆1 = 0. Moreover, the expected value of perfect information after the demand update vanishes (i.e., Substituting this into the last formula of the previous
EVPI1 = 0); earlier, the expected value of perfect de- subsection leads to an expected discounted profit,


mand information is EVPI0 = (1 + α̂)σ02 /4, analogous
(1 + α̂)(1 + δ)
κ20 σ 6
2
Π̂
(κ
)
=
(µ
−
c)
+
0
0
to the earlier expression for EVPI1 with acquisition of
4
(1 + κ0 σ 2 )2
perfect information (for κ1 → ∞) in period 1 (with σd2
2
ˆ 0 (κ0 ) − βκ0 ,
+ (1 + α̂) δ ∆
replaced by σ02 ). (ii) With uninformative demand information it is limσν →∞ ∆0 = ∆1 |σd =σ0 : the firm’s where the expected future informational gain,
beliefs are transmitted “unfiltered” from period 0 to peˆ 0 (κ0 ) , ∆0 |
∆
riod 1, in the sense that (µd , σd2 ) = (µ0 , σ02 ).
σ0 =σ 2 /(1+κ0 σ 2 ) ,
The expected time-0 value of future information acquisition ∆0 is increasing in the firm’s belief uncertainty σ02 ∈ [0, ∞), and
∆1 |σd =σ0


3
σ02
σ 2d
σ2
=
1 − ¯2
≤ ∆0 ≤ 0 ,
4
σ0 +
4

with the bounds obtained in Remark 5.
8 The

is now evaluated with respect to the firm’s initial belief (µ, σ 2 ). As discussed earlier, the latter is tightly
bounded:
ˆ 0,min ≤ ∆
ˆ0 ≤ ∆
ˆ 0,max ,
∆
ˆ 0,max , σ 2 /(4(1 + κ0 σ 2 )) and
where ∆


2 3
σ 2 /4
2 σd
ˆ
∆0,min ,
.
1 − (1 + κ0 σ ) ¯ 2
1 + κ0 σ 2
σ +

internal information may be provided by the accounting department or a market-intelligence group tasked with evaluating demand.
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While the time-0 information-acquisition problem does
not have an explicit solution, closed-form expressions
ˆ 0 is refor “boundary solutions” are available when ∆
9
placed by one of its bounds. The optimal time-0 information acquisition κ∗0 satisfies


2
(1 + δ)κ20 σ 6
ˆ 0 (κ0 ) − βκ0 ,
+
δ
∆
κ∗0 ∈ arg max
κ0 ≥0 4(1 + κ0 σ 2 )2
1 + α̂
and can be determined numerically using standard
methods.10
The belief update in the future depends on the firm’s
choice of κ0 . Indeed, the variance after the demand observation is
σd2 =

σ02
1 + κν σ02

=
2

σ
σ02 = 1+κ

0σ

2

σ2
,
1 + (κ0 + κν ) σ 2

which illustrates the fact that the confidence levels of
subsequent belief updates are additive.11 In this manner,
the firm’s optimal time-1 information-acquisition decision can be written as a function of its time-0 information acquisition:


1
1
κ∗1 (κ0 ) =
.
−
−
(κ
+
κ
)
0
ν
σ 2d
σ2
+
¯
This means that the firm acquires information in the second period if and only if its accumulated confidence
does not exceed the target confidence level κd , 1/σ 2d :
¯
¯
1
κ∗1 (κ0 ) > 0 ⇔ κ0 + κν + 2 > κd .
σ
¯
More specifically, the firm’s confidence at the end of
the horizon (see footnote 11), after having observed all
available information, will be equal to


1
1
=
max
κ
,
κ
+
κ
+
,
0
ν
σ12
σ2
¯d
where κd = ((1 + α̂)/(4β))1/3 . In the second pe¯
riod, provided
there is an incentive to acquire a positive
amount of information (so κ∗1 (κ0 ) > 0), the firm considers κ1 and κ0 to be perfect substitutes:
dκ∗1 (κ0 )
= −1{κ0 <κd −κν −(1/σ2 )} .
¯
dκ0

In case the firm does not want to acquire any information in the second period, so κ∗1 (κ0 ) = 0, the expected
future informational gain,
2

σ2
κν σ 2
1
∗
ˆ
,
∆0 (κ0 |κ1 = 0) =
4 1 + (κ0 + κν ) σ 2
1 + κ0 σ 2
stems only from the upcoming costless observation of
demand. As κν increases, the firm’s incentive to acquire
information in the first period decreases. Indeed, since
ˆ 0 (κ0 |κ∗ = 0) is submodular in (κ0 , κν ),12 κ∗ is de∆
1
0
creasing in the confidence κν with respect to demand
observations, provided that κ∗1 = 0. On the other hand,
if κν becomes sufficiently large, it will be best for the
firm to stop acquiring information in the second period:
there is a threshold confidence level κν , so that 13
¯
κν ≥ κν ⇒ κ∗1 = 0.
¯
On the other hand, if the demand observation is uninformative (i.e., if κν = 0), then
σ 2 /4
,
1 + κ0 σ 2
which leads to an optimal time-0 confidence level
κ∗0 that is less than the solution one would obtain conditional on κ∗1 = 0 when the firm’s
information-acquisition problem would be isomorphic
to its information-acquisition problem at time 1, up to
the factor (1 + δ).14 The following main result largely
summarizes the preceding discussions.
ˆ 0 (κ0 ) =
∆

Theorem (Optimal Information Acquisition). Consider variations of the firm’s (nonnegative) confidence κν in demand observations.
(i) If the precision κ0 of the information collected
in the first period (weakly) exceeds the optimal
amount κ∗0 , then information acquisition in the
second period is never optimal (i.e., κ∗1 (κ0 ) = 0);
in particular: κ∗1 (κ∗0 ) = 0.
(ii) If, for some suboptimal κ0 implemented in the
first period, information collection is optimal in
the second period (i.e., κ∗1 (κ0 ) > 0), then κν
is a direct substitute for κ∗1 (in the sense that
∂κ∗1 /∂κν = −1), as long as κν stays below the
threshold κν (κ0 ) , κd −κ0 beyond which κ∗1 (κ0 )
¯
¯
vanishes;

9 As

roots of fourth-degree polynomials these expressions are, however, not particularly informative, and have therefore been omitted.
we use the fact that the solution to a maximization problem is homogeneous of degree zero. A solution to this nonconvex problem
exists by the Weierstrass theorem ([3], p. 540); in this context, one can restrict attention to a compact interval (i.e., to κ0 ∈ [0, κ̄0 ] for some
κ̄0 ∈ (0, ∞)) because the objective function is coercive for large values of κ0 ([3], p. 539). For global optimality conditions, see [24].
11 The firm’s belief variance, after having observed the signal s̃ with confidence κ , is σ 2 = σ 2 /(1 + (κ + κ + κ ) σ 2 ).
ν
1
1
0
1
1
12 A sufficient condition for submodularity is that ∂ 2 ∆
ˆ 0 (κ0 |κ∗ = 0)/(∂κ0 ∂κν ) = −(3/2)κν σ 8 /(1 + (κ0 + κν )σ 2 )4 < 0.
1
13 One possible threshold is κ , max{0, κ − (1/σ 2 ) − κ∗ }, where κ∗ , lim
∗
κν →∞ κ0 is the asymptotic confidence of time-0 inforν
d
¯0
¯0
mation collection as κν → ∞.¯ Note that even¯ for κν → ∞, information
acquisition
in the first period may be optimal (κ∗0 > 0) because it
carries an immediate benefit for the firm’soperational 
decisions before demand is observed.


10 Here

14 In

that case, one would obtain κ∗0 =

1+δ

σ 2d −
¯

1
σ2

which would imply that κ∗1 (κ∗0 ) = 0 because

+

1
2
σd

= max

1 1+δ
,
σ2 σ 2
d

¯

≥ σ12 .
¯d

Page 6634

(iii) For κν ≥ κν , the optimal first-period confidence period information acquisition of
¯
κ∗0 decreases, and as in part (i): κ∗1 = 0.
p
κ̄B = B/c.
Part (i) of the theorem states that with optimal information collection in the first period it is never optimal to collect information in the second period. Due
to space constraints our proof for this statement will
be somewhat informal via three observations, leaving
some of the analytical details as exercise to the reader.
The first observation is that in order to encourage information collection in the second period it is best to
set κν = 0. This is in view of part (ii) of the theorem which is a direct result from the explicit expression
for κ∗1 (κ0 ) given earlier. In other words, if κ∗1 > 0 is
optimal for some κν > 0, then κ∗0 > 0 is a forteriori
also optimal for κν = 0. Our second observation is
that for δ = 0, the firm does not care about the future,
and the first-period problem is equivalent to the quasistatic problem discussed in Sec. 3. In that case, the
firm’s optimal
first-period
 information acquisition will

be κ∗0 = κd − (1/σ 2 ) + , so that the confidence at the
¯ the second period is κ = κ . But this imbeginning of
d
d
mediately implies that κ∗1 = 0. The third¯ observation is
that κ∗0 is nondecreasing in the discount factor δ given
that κ∗1 = 0 (and κν = 0). This holds because in that
case the first-period objective function Π̂0 is supermodular in (κ0 , δ).15 This concludes our informal proof.
Intuitively, information collected in the first period
remains useful in the second period, so that the firm
can “double-dip” (improving two sets of operational decisions in different periods) by acquiring information
early. However, while this intuition is appealing, the result does come with a certain surprise because the information acquisition cost is after all convex in the signal
precision, which a priori would suggest some consumption smoothing across periods with respect to information acquisition.

4.4

Extension: Info-Budget Constraint

While our main result indicates that costly information
should be acquired early if its use value carries across
periods, this may not be possible in practice because of
the budgetary realities that firms face. Periodic planning that is tied to accounting cycles usually implies
budgets for various actions, especially when it comes
to the solicitation of outside information-collection services. Given a positive per-period “info-budget” of B
for information collection, this implies a maximum per-

Hence, from the theorem established in Sec. 4.3
one obtains immediately that the optimal informationcollection policy (κ̂∗0 , κ∗1 ) is such that
κ̂∗0 = min{κ∗0 , κ̄B } and κ̂∗1 = min{κ∗1 (κ̂∗0 ), κ̄B };
that is, the per-period budget constraint simply caps
the unconstrained first-period information acquisition
and then the firm’s conditionally optimal second-period
choice. In particular, the budget constraint–when
binding–induces a smoothing of the firm’s external information acquisition across periods; see Fig. 3.

Figure 3:
Cumulative confidence with budgetconstrained information acquisition, as a function of the
precision of the firm’s demand observation.

4.5

Numerical Example

Unconstrained Information Acquisition. Consider a
firm with operational costs (α, β) = (1, 0.1) and discount factor δ = 0.8; this implies an advertising effectiveness of α̂ = 1/(2·1−1) = 1. The time-1 confidence
target is given by
1
κd = 2 =
σd
¯
¯



1 + α̂
4β

1/3
≈ 1.71.


∂ 2 Π0
∂
ˆ 0 (κ0 ) , is nonto a multiplicative constant, the cross-partial of the objective function, ∂κ
∼ ∂κ
κ20 σ 6 /(4(1 + κ0 σ 2 )2 ) + ∆
0 ∂δ
0
ˆ 0 (κ0 ) = 0 in the case where κν = κ∗ (κ0 ) = 0. Thus, one obtains the supermodularity of Π̂0 in (κ0 , δ). Finally, note
negative given that ∆
1
ˆ 0 vanishes for κ∗ for δ = 0, and it also vanishes when it is even larger (confirmed by the supermodularity) for δ > 0.
that ∆
15 Up

0

Page 6635

Figure 4: Unconstrained first-period information acquisition κ∗0 as a function of κν in the numerical example.
Assuming that the firm’s initial belief about demand
is given by (µ, σ 2 ) with expectation µ = 100 and standard deviation σ = 30 (so the coefficient of variation
is 30%), the initial confidence level is 1/σ 2 ≈ 0.0011.
This is three orders of magnitude below the target confidence κd , which suggests that active information acquisition¯ may be desirable—even if it is costly. Fig. 4
shows the optimal first-period information acquisition
policy as a function of κν in the absence of any infobudget constraint. As shown earlier, the second-period
information acquisition vanishes in that case, so κ∗1 = 0
for all κν ≥ 0.
Budget-Constrained Information Acquisition. Suppose
now that the firm has a positive info-budget B so that
κ̄B < κ∗0 at least for small values of κν . Then qualitatively the optimal-information acquisition policy is as in
Fig. 3. Specifically, for our numerical values we obtain
a second-period information acquisition of the form
n
o
√
κ∗1 (κ̂∗1 ) ≈ min [1.7089 − κ̂∗1 − κν ]+ , 10B ,
for all κν ≥ 0, where κ̂∗0 is the truncated unconstrained
first-period information acquisition, as noted in Sec. 4.4.

5

Conclusion

The ability to advertise allows the firm to scale up its
profitability. It also increases the returns on additional

information about its uncertain demand. In the absence
of spending constraints and given a stationary random
demand, we obtain that information should be acquired
upfront so as to be used multiple times. In that sense, information can behave like an investment good that pays
a periodic rent through the operational improvements it
enables.
The firm’s short-term interest in information exhibits a threshold; its goal in the quasi-static setting (at
the end of the finite time horizon) is to achieve a target confidence level, as if it was following an (s, S)inventory policy [1, 20]. When actively considering
the future, such as at the initial time (t = 0), the firm
rationally anticipates future benefits of acquired information in addition to the expected effects of any costless complementary signals observed later, for example, as a result of intermittent demand observations via
the data stream from its accounting department. It is
interesting that threshold effects arise despite the fact
that information-acquisition cost is quadratic in the signal precision.16 To achieve a very high precision the
firm can expect a substantial information-acquisition
expense which may well violate internal budget constraints.17 The latter may lead to the (constrained)
smoothing of information consumption over time instead of full upfront information collection in the unconstrained case.
Our work fits in with an increasing interest in the
interaction of costly information and operational decisions, for example in inventory control problems [7]
or in pricing problems [5]. The fundamental difference between advertising and information as drivers of
profitability is that advertising tends to enlarge the pie,
whereas information renders the size of the pie and the
effect of the operational decisions less uncertain. Information is therefore not an end in itself,18 but rather a
complement to managerial actions.
An interesting direction for future research may be
an extension of this framework to situations where the
quality of the costly information depends on the operational actions (e.g., the demand information gathered
from an advertising campaign or by means of a price
discount), giving rise to “monopoly experimentation.”
Then the firm would need to trade off the possible lack
in optimality of its operational experiments in the shortrun against the increased confidence in its demand information in the medium-run together with the improved
operational decisions the firm will be able to take.

16 The cost of external information is naturally convex because it becomes more and more difficult to increase the confidence in demand
information, e.g., by enlarging the sample further, beyond an established panel. The threshold nature of information acquisition also obtains in
a linear-quadratic infinite-horizon setting with Gaussian noise and linear cost of information acquisition [25].
17 Even if the external market intelligence provides a noise-free signal (of infinite confidence), the firm continues to experience uncertainty
from period to period because of the persistent unsystematic noise in the system. In particular, the perfect adaptation of price and advertising
to actually realized demand conditions in any given period remains a zero-probability event.
18 This is notwithstanding investors’ having a vested interest to reduce profit uncertainty, all else equal; see also footnote 4.
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